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Tanzania Re-Elects Samia Suluhu Hassan with 97.66% in Tumultuous Vote Amid Violent Protests

Tanzania Re-Elects Samia Suluhu Hassan with 97.66% in Tumultuous Vote Amid Violent Protests

Tanzania Re-Elects Samia Suluhu Hassan with 97.66% in Tumultuous Vote Amid Violent Protests

On November 1, 2025, Tanzania’s National Electoral Commission declared that President Samia Suluhu Hassan had secured a sweeping victory in the October 29 elections, capturing 97.66% of the vote. The landslide triumph marked her first full term since ascending from the vice presidency following the death of President John Magufuli in 2021.

Yet the announcement came amid severe unrest and credible reports of deadly clashes, internet blackouts, opposition exclusion, and widespread skepticism about the election’s fairness. Opposition parties, civil society organizations, and international observers warned that the election had morphed into a coronation rather than a competitive democratic contest.

This investigative feature explores how Tanzania arrived at this moment: the political constraints, the protests, the security clampdown, and the multiple fault lines now threatening the country’s fragile legitimacy.

When John Magufuli died unexpectedly in March 2021, Samia Suluhu Hassan, then vice president, became president. Her assumption of office was constitutionally smooth but carried the burden of navigating a party—the long-dominant Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)—divided between factions loyal to Magufuli’s uncompromising style and those pressing for moderation.

Hassan initially enjoyed goodwill as a conciliatory figure, loosening some restrictions on media and political space. But as 2025 approached, CCM’s internal pressures and the desire to consolidate her leadership appeared to push her regime toward deeper authoritarian measures.

By mid-2025, the political playing field had narrowed drastically. Tundu Lissu, leader of the opposition party Chadema, was arrested and charged with treason and cybercrime after taking a strong stance on electoral reform. Lissu’s party was barred from fielding candidates entirely. Another opposition figure, Luhaga Mpina of ACT-Wazalendo, was disqualified from running via technicalities. The result was that Hassan faced little real competition—only minor-party candidates lacking nationwide support.

Leading into election day, dozens of activists, opposition members, and journalists were detained or “disappeared.” The pre-electoral period thus became marked by intimidation and an imbalance of power.

On election day, as Tanzanians attempted to vote, signs of disorder quickly emerged in Dar es Salaam and other urban centers. Protesters took to the streets, burning tires, tearing down campaign posters, and attacking polling infrastructure. Authorities declared a curfew, deployed police and military forces, and severed internet connectivity nationwide. The communication blackout hampered independent monitoring and deepened fears of state concealment.

Clashes escalated as security forces used tear gas, rubber bullets, and reportedly live ammunition to disperse crowds. Protesters reported being shot in the streets; security sources confirmed the use of force but downplayed the scale. The main opposition party, Chadema, claimed that around 700 people had died in nationwide violence. Journalists and hospitals cited multiple fatalities and wounded, though the government dismissed higher figures as exaggerated. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights confirmed at least ten deaths in three cities.

Protests continued for days in Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, Arusha, Morogoro, and other regions, even as curfews and security presence intensified.

The electoral commission later announced that Hassan secured 31.9 million votes, equating to 97.66% of turnout, with a reported 87% participation from 37.6 million registered voters. While authorities maintained that the vote was free and credible, critics focused on the improbability of such figures—especially in a contest lacking major opposition and marred by violence.

Observers and analysts noted unusually low participation, particularly in areas affected by unrest, though the commission’s figure claimed robust turnout. Many polling stations were deserted or inaccessible as violence erupted. International observers were largely absent, civil society was silenced, and media freedoms curtailed.

Following the results, President Hassan condemned the protests as acts of irresponsible criminals and pledged to preserve national security by all means. The government denied allegations of excessive force, maintaining that only isolated disturbances needed controlling. To consolidate order, authorities extended the internet blackout, suspended universities, and restricted movement while deploying heavy police and military presence across the country.

Army Chief Jacob Mkunda publicly branded protesters as criminals and confirmed that the armed forces would help restore calm.

The opposition, led by remnants of Chadema, rejected the result, calling for a transitional government and the release of detained figures. International human rights bodies criticized the crackdown, and UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres urged a full investigation into alleged killings. Some embassies issued travel advisories, and cross-border trade with Kenya was briefly disrupted.

The opposition’s casualty claims of 700 deaths remain disputed. Hospital sources and NGOs confirmed dozens but could not verify the full extent. The opacity of state control and restricted media access made precise figures impossible to ascertain.

Analysts describe the election as a coronation, not a contest. By disqualifying major opposition candidates and suppressing dissent, the process reflected the consolidation of CCM dominance rather than democratic competition. The 97.66% margin reinforced concerns that electoral outcomes in Tanzania had become ritualized affirmations of incumbency rather than genuine expressions of voter choice.

Such outcomes reinforce single-party hegemony and narrow the democratic space. Many observers warn that this model—winning through overwhelming margins amid repression—is becoming normalized across several African states, threatening the continent’s democratic credibility.

The violent suppression of protests and the broader climate of fear carry lasting consequences. Public trust in institutions has eroded; citizens increasingly view elections as predetermined exercises. In this environment, legitimacy depends less on public consent and more on coercion.

Reliance on force over consensus may alienate Tanzania’s youth and urban populations, whose growing frustration could ignite cycles of unrest. The internet blackout, media suppression, and militarization of election security transformed what should have been a civic exercise into a securitized event. This strategy fits a broader global trend in which digital censorship and state surveillance are wielded to control political narratives.

Eyewitnesses provide chilling insights. One Dar es Salaam resident told reporters that he saw police shoot protesters who were merely throwing stones at a campaign poster. Hospital workers in Mwanza reported multiple bodies arriving with gunshot wounds. A local activist recounted that security officers visited his home days before the election, ordering him to cease mobilizing for opposition activities; he complied out of fear of disappearance. These accounts, though unverifiable, fit broader patterns of political violence in the region.

Tanzania’s election joins a growing list of African polls overshadowed by state repression and contested results. From Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni to Rwanda’s Paul Kagame and Zimbabwe’s Emmerson Mnangagwa, a familiar template emerges—landslide victories underpinned by opposition exclusion, media restriction, and coercive control.

But such systems, while stable in the short term, are brittle in the long run. Beneath their façade of stability lies growing public disillusionment. Without institutional reforms and genuine inclusion, these regimes risk social explosions that could undo decades of progress.

For President Hassan, her second term presents formidable challenges. Her legitimacy—though officially confirmed—will remain contested. Domestically, she must balance power consolidation with demands for reform. Internationally, she faces scrutiny from development partners who may condition aid on governance improvements. Opposition movements, even weakened, will continue to organize covertly and through the diaspora, keeping the flame of dissent alive.

To restore credibility, her administration would need to rebuild institutional independence, open civic space, and engage with dissenting voices. Whether she chooses that path—or continues on the trajectory of suppression—will determine Tanzania’s democratic future.

In conclusion, Samia Suluhu Hassan’s overwhelming electoral victory is both a testament to her political dominance and a warning sign of democratic decline. The scale of her win, achieved amid violence and repression, offers her authority but not necessarily legitimacy.

Tanzania now faces a crucial crossroad: the choice between governance grounded in consent or in control. The events of this election, the protests, and the bloodshed will echo for years to come. They will shape not only the nation’s politics but also its moral narrative—of a people yearning for voice in a system that too often silences dissent.

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